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ABSTRACT: Analysis of the results of EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia since the 
beginning of its activities in June 2015, aiming to assert the level of achievement of its goals and 
conclude whether the establishment of a military operation was the best option to tackle a 
humanitarian crisis, as well as what have been the outcomes of the Operation for migrant 
mobility and for the actors involved, in particular, to the European solidarity system. The 
overview of the data presented by EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia helps to draw 
considerations for the future of the EU when dealing with future similar crises, not only affecting 
Europe, but in any country taking in consideration the migratory exodus happening, for example 
in South America these days, and that may be extended internationally. Is in this cases, where 
people flee from their origin countries seeking for shelter, when we must be aware of the 
necessary guarantee of Human Rights. 
Keywords: Human Rights. Migration. European Union. EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. 
Military interventions. 
 
RESUMEN: Análisis de los resultados de la Operación EUNAVFOR MED Sofía desde el inicio 
de su actividad en junio de 2015, con el fin de determinar el grado de cumplimiento de sus 
objetivos. Se pretende arrojar luz sobre la necesidad de una operación militar con el objeto de 
paliar los efectos propios de una crisis humanitaria. Igualmente se analizan cuáles han sido las 
consecuencias tanto para los flujos de migración como para los actores involucrados, en 
particular, en el sistema de solidaridad europeo. Se presentan igualmente conclusiones derivadas 
del análisis de EUNAVFOR MED Sofía, y consideraciones a tener en cuenta para poder hacer 
frente a futuras crisis similares, no solamente en el marco de la Unión Europea, sino en otros 
países, a la vista de los éxodos migratorios que se vienen produciendo, especialmente en 
Sudamérica en la actualidad, y que se extenderán a nivel internacional. En estas realidades 
debemos ser, más que nunca, consecuentes de la necesaria garantía y protección de los Derechos 
Humanos. 
Palabras clave: Derechos Humanos. Migración. Unión Europea. EUNAVFOR MED Operación 
Sofía. Intervenciones militares. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
EUNAVFOR MED (EU Naval Force in the Mediterranean) Sophia was established in 
May 2015 as a response to the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean Sea. The aim of the 
operation is the disruption of the business model of migrant smugglers and human traffickers in 
the Mediterranean, whose activities endangers migrants‟ lives and has caused several loss of life 
at sea at the gates of Europe. The launching of Operation Sophia is a landmark in the European 
Union‟s history, because it is the first time that a naval operation is coordinated within the EU 
framework, engaging in search and rescue activities. Nevertheless, it is not the first time the EU 
launches a military operation to tackle a humanitarian crisis, as EUNAVFOR MED Atalanta had 
been launched in 2008 to help protect the ships involved in the transport and delivery of 
humanitarian aid to Somalia. A naval operation was already conducted by the Italian government 
in 2013, under the name of Operation Mare Nostrum, with a similar mandate. However, 
Operation Sophia is the first military operation coordinated by the EU‟s institutions, aimed at 
tackling a humanitarian crisis. 
After a new tragedy occurred in the central Mediterranean on 20 April 2015, when a 
shipwreck meant around 800 deaths of migrants departing from Libya,
1
 the European Union 
declared “war” against migrant smugglers. The European Council concluded that it would 
“mobilise all efforts at its disposal to prevent further loss of life at sea”, to fight the traffickers, 
prevent illegal migration flows and to reinforce internal solidarity and responsibility.
2
 Following 
this, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy presented the European Agenda on Migration, as a part of the comprehensive 
approach to tackle the crisis. Among this measures, EUNAVFOR MED were to be designed to 
identify the criminal networks, as well as to proceed with arrests and search and rescue 
operations, in cooperation with other EU agencies, such as the European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency (Frontex), or Europol. 
According to Article 42(1) of the Treaty on the European Union, the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) vests the European Union with the operational capacity to establish 
military and civil missions outside the territory of the Union for peace-keeping, conflict 
prevention and international security. The CSDP is an integrated part of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, which allowed the EU to 
develop a foreign policy and to have a unique voice, represented by European External Action 
Service. Decisions on CSDP are made unanimously by the Member States (MS) in the European 
Council. On 18 May 2015, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union military 
operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED) was adopted.
3
 The aim of 
                                                          
1
 See Bonomolo A., Kirchgaessner S. (2015, April 20). UN says 800 migrants dead in boat disaster as Italy launches 
rescue of two more vessels. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/italy-
pm-matteo-renzi-migrant-shipwreck-crisis-srebrenica-massacre. 
2
 European Commission, Europe is declaring war on smugglers, Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos at the 
press conference in Castille Place, Malta, 23 April 2015. 
3
 European Union: Council of the European Union. Council Decision 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European 
Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED). 19 May 2015. O.J. L122/31. 
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EUNAVFOR MED was to identify, capture, and dispose of vessels and assets used or suspected 
of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, achieving a disruption of their business model, 
and thus preventing further loss of life at sea.  
Article 1 of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 states that “the Union shall conduct a 
military crisis management operation contributing to the disruption of the business model of 
human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean, achieved by 
undertaking systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and assets used or being 
used by smugglers or traffickers, in accordance with applicable international law”. 
The naval operation was structured in three sequential phases: in the first phase, 
conducted between June and October 2015, the naval assets Sophia supported the detection and 
monitoring of migration networks by patrolling on the high seas and gathering information. Since 
7 October 2015, the operation has been in Phase 2, in which the naval operation conduct 
boarding, search, seizure, and diversion of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling 
or trafficking, under the conditions laid down by international law, including the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, an the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants. In Phase 
2B, in accordance with any applicable UNSC Resolution or consent by the coastal state (Libya), 
Sophia shall conduct boarding, search, seizure, and diversion, on the high seas or in territorial 
and internal waters of the state, of vessels suspected of being used for human smuggling or 
trafficking. In the third and final phase, the naval operation shall take all necessary measures 
against a vessel and related assets, including disposal and confiscation, if they are suspected of 
being used for human smuggling or trafficking, again, in accordance with any applicable UNSC 
Resolution or consent by Libya. The Council of the EU, by its Decision (CFSP) 2016/993 of 20 
June 2016, amended its previous Decisions by adding two supporting tasks to Operation Sophia: 
capacity building and training of the Libyan Coast Guard, and contribution to the implementation 
of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.
4
 
The required United Nations Security Council‟s support came a few months after 
Operation Sophia was established, but it was only a partial measure. On 9 October 2015 the 
UNSC adopted Resolution 2240 by which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN, 
authorized Member States to use all measures in confronting migrant smugglers or human 
traffickers in full compliance with international human rights law.
5
 The Resolution authorized the 
inspection on the high seas off the coast of Libya of suspect vessels of being used for migrant 
smuggling and human trafficking from Libya. The time was authorized for one year, from 18 
May 2015 to 18 May 2016. Later on, the UNSC extended this authorization for three more 
periods of one year, until summer 2019. 
 
1. OPERATION SOPHIA 
 
EUNAVFOR MED has been subject to several analyses and criticisms. Given the 
relevance of the crisis the Operation has to deal with, the implications of its activities and the 
very nature of the European Union, Operation Sophia is under the scope of several institutions, 
political, military or academic. One of the roughest critical voices with the Operation has been 
the UK House of Lords, which in July 2017 published its second report on EUNAVFOR MED, 
and called it “Operation Sophia: a failed mission”.6 
                                                          
4
 For the UN arms embargo, see United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2292 (2016), on the situation In Libya, 
of 14 June 2016, S/RES/2292(2016). 
5
 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2240 (2015) on migrant smuggling and human trafficking into, 
through and from the Libyan territory. 9 October 2015, S/RES/2240 (2015). 
6
 House of Lords (2017), Operation Sophia, a failed mission, European Union Committee, 2
nd
 Report of Session 
2017-2019, retrieved from https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/5/5.pdf 
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During its almost three years of activity, the naval operation has raised many concerns, 
mainly regarding refugee law or Human Rights law, but also the very intentions behind the 
European Union‟s main actors when deciding to launch a military operation to tackle the Central 
Mediterranean crisis. Proceedings carried out and the coordination with the other EU Agencies 
involved have been also put at stake, and finally, some have questioned the efficacy of Operation 
Sophia, or even argued that it hasn‟t been helpful at all. 
From the Human Rights law perspective, while some argue that the EU should establish 
legal ways to reach Europe in a safe manner, others say that engaging in Search and Rescue 
activities only helps to produce a “pulling effect” on migrants.7 The cooperation with the Libyan 
authorities is not regarded as having been successful, as reports indicate that the Libyan Coast 
Guard keeps endangering migrants, but also critical voices argue that training the LCG is only 
aimed at reducing migration to the EU, in what it‟s called an externalization of the EU borders.8 
As from the operational point of view, it has been argued that Operation Sophia will 
never be able to achieve its goal of disrupting the business model of migrant smugglers and 
human traffickers, as it has been aiming toward the symptoms of the problem, rather than to the 
roots. This is, lacking authorization to enter Libyan territory, so only low targets can be arrested. 
In addition, the EU has failed by not establishing a defined mechanism on how the arrests and 
prosecutions should be carried out, as the military task force lacks the capacities and jurisdiction 
required. Only Italy has prosecuted the suspected migrant smugglers and human traffickers 
arrested by Operation Sophia.  
Lastly, the very efficacy of EUNAVFOR MED is questioned by some, regarding the 
prevention of further deaths at sea, which has been the main goal of the Operation. Critics argue 
that the number of deaths at sea have not decreased over the years, which might be true, but a 
bigger picture is necessary in order to address this issue: total migrants flow vary according to 
several factors and it‟s not dependent on the presence of a naval force in the route. A bigger flow 
of migrants means a bigger number of people endangered. In consequence, total flows of 
migrants have to be considered together with the amount of deaths. Since the establishment of 
Operation Sophia, significant achievements have been reached in this regard. According to the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, the number of deaths at sea “would have 
been significantly higher had it not been for the Search and Rescue operations carried out”.9 
The migration crisis, nevertheless, has not only affected the European Union regarding 
security matters. The European Union policy-making and basic principles have been also 
challenged due to the huge amount of migrants reaching the Union and the debate on how 
Member States should act.
 10
 European migration policy has advanced since 2015 with the 
adoption of the European Agenda on Migration.
11
 
                                                          
7
 Dearden, L., (2017, June 9). Refugee rescue ships not acting as „pull factor‟ or „colluding with people smugglers‟, 
report finds. Independent. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/refugee-crisis-europe-
rescue-boats-ngos-pull-factor-collusion-smugglers-report-debunked-goldmiths-a7782781.html 
8
 Baczynska, G. (2018, July 8). EU migration policies seen building blocks for „Fortress Europe‟, Reuters. Retrieved 
from https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-analysis/eu-migration-policies-seen-building-blocks-for-
fortress-europe-idUKKBN1JY07V 
9
 Grandi, F. (2016). Speech by Filippo Grandi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, at the European 
Policy Centre, Brussels 5/12-2016. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/admin/58456ec34/protecting-refugees-europe-
beyond-eu-rise-challenge.html 
10
 European Commission. (July 2017).  The EU and the Migration Crisis. Retrieved from 
http://publications.europa.eu/webpub/com/factsheets/migration-crisis/en/ 
11
 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A European Agenda of Migration, 13 
May 2015, COM(2015) 240 final.  
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Over the last three years, steps have been taken by the European Union covering various 
ranges of politics. Agreements of relocation have been signed, borders have been reinforced,
12
 
and humanitarian and development funds have been granted, as the comprehensive approach to 
migration requires. The European Union Trust Fund for Syria received €0.6 billion from 2015 to 
2017, and €2.4 billion were assigned to the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. Also, the EU‟s 
funds that help migrants in countries like Jordan, Lebanon or Turkey, were €1.6 billion as 
assigned. 
Dealing with migration inside the EU territory has proven to be quite more challenging, 
where the main political actors are facing a two-folded case, as migration became the top priority 
concern across the bloc, and different political groups are facing the challenge in different ways. 
First, countries like Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, which have refused to take 
in asylum-seekers, represent one side of the coin, putting at stake the very foundational grounds 
of European integration, i.e. the principle of solidarity.
13
 Also, financial strains plus concerns 
over national security and cultural assimilation have encouraged the growth of far-right-anti-
immigrant parties. Other countries like Germany, France, and Spain, represent the approach 
based on solidarity and responsibility among Member States, and backing sanctions against 
countries that don‟t want to deliver with their commitment.14 
It is apparent that the migratory crisis will have a lasting effect in European politics and 
integration. Many agree that Europe needs to urgently overhaul its asylum and immigration rules. 
While some push for tougher border control, others seek a fairer distribution on new arrivals.  
 
1.1 CRITIQUES  
 
1.1.1 Regarding the Purpose of the Operation  
 
1.1.1.1 A Military Operation to Deal with a Humanitarian Crisis 
 
The response given by the European Union, launching a military operation to prevent 
loss of life at sea, could be seen as the militarization of a humanitarian crisis by an Operation 
authorized to use coercive force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the criminalization of 
migrants, who are not other but endangered people.
15
 In fact, this reasoning makes a point: if 
Operation Sophia was launched to help refugees in distress at sea, in line with the humanitarian 
foreign policy model, it‟s to be expected that the Operation is established and conducted as a 
search and rescue operation, which must be the main priority of its task force. Furthermore, some 
authors say that, when deciding how to launch Operation Sophia, it was clear that the Operation 
would never be able to successfully advance into Phase 2B,
16
 which is the core of the “disruption 
of the smugglers and traffickers business model” part of its mandate.  
                                                          
12
 European Commission. (2016, June 22) press release, European Border and Coast Guard agreed. (Press release). 
Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2292_en.htm 
13
 Article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: The policies of the Union set out in this 
chapter shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair share of responsibility. European Union: 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 2007. O.J. C326/01, 26 
October 2012.  
14
 Henley, J. (2018, June 27). EU migration crisis: what are the key issues? The Guardian. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/27/eu-migration-crisis-what-are-the-issues 
15
 Arenas, N. (2016). Flujos masivos de población y seguridad. La crisis de personas refugiadas en el Mediterráneo, 
Araucaria, Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades. p. 368, and pp 339-372.  
 
16
 Ingemann Johansen, A., (2017), Assessing the European Union‟s Strategic Capacity: The Case of EUNAVFOR 
MED Operation Sophia. Journal on European Security.  p.521, and pp. 507 – 526. 
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But the way Operation Sophia has been conducted since 2015, both Operation Sophia‟s 
task force and the EU political leaders, has showed a big degree of adaptation to the reality of 
Operation Sophia turning to be a de facto search and rescue operation after smugglers and 
traffickers were pushed back to the Libyan shores. Furthermore, In this sense, Operation Sophia 
“has been ready and equipped to meet their commitments under the International Convention on 
Safety of Law at Sea and the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, to rescue people in distress, 
despite the potential costs of such an approach in terms of attracting more migrants”.17 As Rear 
Admiral Enrico Credendino explained to the Italian Parliament, in light of the events, 
EUNAVFOR MED was launched in record time.
18
 
 
1.1.1.2 Externalization of the EU’s Borders in order to Reduce Migration  
 
In the same line, other authorities question the aim behind the EU when launching 
EUNAVFOR MED, arguing that what the European leaders were looking to block migration to 
the Union, setting up a military task force whose aim was not to rescue people, as it was, for 
example, Operation Mare Nostrum‟s. According to this, the European Union would be 
“obstructing individual‟s access to international protection”,19 and blocking a migration route 
alleging to prevent shipwrecks.
20
 The reason behind this alleged intention would be the 
unwillingness of the EU leaders to take a decisive approach to the refugee crisis due to the many 
concerns migration is raising along Europe in terms of national security and cultural 
assimilation.
21
 This view of the externalization of the EU‟s borders is supported by the overall 
image of the European Union presence in Africa, where its civil missions and military operations 
seem to have moved the EU borders towards the Sahel.  It is true is that various political figures 
along the EU have claimed that such operations at sea would foster the “pulling effect”, meaning 
that smugglers and traffickers, in the view that migrants are being rescued at sea, would be 
enhanced to keep with their illegal activities, and thus has sent more people to Europe. For 
example, German Interior Minister, Thomas de Maizière, said regarding Operation Mare 
Nostrum that it “proved to be a bridge to Europe”. Finally, others have criticized that the EU 
political leaders did not establish in any resolution how the non-refoulement principle was to be 
made effective, or how Operation Sophia would help to request asylum in the EU upon arrival.
 22
 
1.1.2 Regarding the Progress of the Operation 
 
1.1.2.1 Operation Sophia Addresses the Symptoms of the Migration Crisis, but not the Roots 
 
In his six months report, the Commander of Operation Sophia already emphasised that, 
in order to be really effective against the smugglers‟ business model, transition to Phase 2B had 
                                                          
17
 Riddervold, M., The Maritime turn in EU Foreign and Security Policies. Aims, Actors and Mechanisms of 
Integration, Palgrave MacMillan, ed 1 (2017), Switzerland. p. 69. 
18
 Senato della Repubblica. (2016). Audizione dell‟ ammiraglio di divisione Enrico Credendino, Operation 
Commander della operatione EUNAVFOR MED – Operazione Sophia. 18ª seduta, 4 febbraio, AU 0683. Roma: 
Senato della Repubblica. 
19
 Garelli, G., Tazzioli M., The Humanitarian War Against Migrant Smugglers at Sea, Forthcoming, Antipode, 
Volume 50(3) „Mediterranean Movements: Mobility Struggles, Border Restructuring, and The Humanitarian 
Frontier‟), 2015, p. 690, and pp. 685-703. 
20
 Ventrella, M (2016), The impact of Operation Sophia on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction against migrant 
smugglers and human traffickers. Questions of International Law, Volume 30, p. 16, and pp. 3 – 18. 
21
 Berry, M., Garcia-Blanco, I., & Moore, K. (2016). Press coverage of the refugee and migrant crisis in the EU: A 
content analysis of five European countries. Project report. Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/56bb369c9.html 
22
 Arenas, N. (2016), Flujos masivos de población y seguridad. La crisis de personas refugiadas en el Mediterráneo, 
p. 353. Supra note. 
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to be done as soon as possible.
23
 Noting that the report is dated from December 2017, we can 
conclude that no great progress has been made on the disruption of the smugglers‟ business 
model. In fact, even though EUNAVFOR MED has contributed to the arrest of 148 suspected 
criminals to date, the majority of them have been low targets.
24
 Also, when the naval assets of the 
Operation started patrolling on the high seas, and the smugglers and traffickers were pushed back 
to Libya, Operation Sophia reduced its activities to mainly the search and rescue: note that from 
June 2017 to June 2018, the number of suspected smugglers or traffickers arrested were only 
39.
25
 
As a result, the very impact on the smuggling networks is questioned: if you only tackle 
the criminals at the bottom, who are easily replaced, the business model will not be affected, 
since the data you can gather is not enough to get to the command of these mafias. Apart from 
this, even if Operation Sophia were able to identify the criminals at the top of the organizations, 
further actions would be simply impossible, as there is no UNSC authorization to access the 
Libyan territorial waters and inland, nor is there Libyan consent. 
Furthermore, migration from Libya is not a consequence of the mafias‟ activities, but of 
a greater picture of conflicts over Africa and the Middle-East, of which migrants are running 
away. If Operation Sophia were successful, this does not mean that migration would be stopped, 
but only that the Libyan route could be paralyzed for a certain period, with high possibilities that 
other migration routes in the Mediterranean would see its flows increasing.
26
   
 
1.1.2.2 Operation Sophia has Endangered Migrants 
 
Regarding migrants endangered as a consequence of EUNAVFOR MED‟s activities, 
two main points emerge: the destruction of the vessels employed by the mafias to ferry migrants 
to the EU, and the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the Libyan authorities for training 
and capacity building of the Libyan Coastguard. 
Destroying the vessels used for ferrying people across the Mediterranean is supposed to 
prevent shipwrecks. Nevertheless, migrant smugglers and human traffickers adapted their 
business model, and the safer fiber-glass boats were no longer used, representing a financial loss 
after destructed. Instead, rubber dinghies started being used, having less capacity and more 
limited conditions, and used to carry equal amounts of people.
27
  
The Memorandum of Understanding with the Libyan authorities has been criticized by 
different institutions due to the dire human rights situation that persists in Libya today. In 
addition, there has been several alarming news about several of the LCG‟s activities. As an 
example, in May 2017, the LCG opened fire on Europe-bound boats full of refugees while rescue 
                                                          
23
 WikiLeaks. (2016). EUNAVFOR MED Op Sophia (2016) – Six Monthly Report 22 June-31 December 2015. 
p.19. Retrieved from https://wikileaks.org/eu-military-refugees/EEAS/EEAS-2016-126.pdf 
24
 House of Lords (2017), Operation Sophia, a failed mission, p.7. Supra note. 
25
 A factsheet released by the EEAS in April 2017 mentioned 109 suspected smugglers apprehended, while the 
factsheet released on June 2018 by the European Commission says the total suspects apprehended is 148. See 
European External Action Service. (2015, April 25). EUNAVFOR MED, MISSION. Retrieved from 
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/april_2017_-_factsheet_on_eunavfor_med_mission_english.pdf, and European 
Commission. (2018, June 26). Central Mediterranean Route: Protecting Migrants and Managing Irregular Flows. 
(Press release). Retrieved from https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/central_med_route_v6.pdf 
26
 Tardy, T., (2015), Operation Sophia. Tackling the refugee crisis with military means, European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, Sep 2015, p.1, retrieved from 
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_30_Operation_Sophia.pdf 
27
 House of Lords (2016), Operation Sophia, the EU‟s naval mission in the Mediterranean: an imposible challenge, 
European Union Committee, 14th Report of Session 2015-16, p.16, retrieved from 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/144/144.pdf 
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attempts were under way.
28
 Reports on beatings by officials of the LCG, as well as rape, torture 
and killings still skyrocketing,
29
 in what is considered to be a failure of the training program, 
which has not been able to achieve a swift end in this trend.  
After all, the endangerment of migrants is not a direct responsibility of Operation 
Sophia, nor of its training program. Since the naval assets cannot access the Libyan territory, it is 
seemingly to be a good idea to develop the capacities of those who deal with migrants there. 
Critics do not consider that given the situation in the country, and knowing that officials of the 
LCG collaborate with the mafia or militia, progress is only to be achieved slowly, and will 
eventually depend on the overall situation of the country. It is assumed at this stage that Libyan 
personnel is not trained by the members of Operation Sophia to pursue such purposes by means 
contrary to international and human rights law. 
Additionally, some argue that the training of the LCG aims at developing the capacity of 
Libya to better control it‟s coastal and territorial waters, relieving the EU of doing this job, and 
aiming to curve migration to the Union. Enhancing the Libyan capacity to prevent those fleeing 
ill-treatment in Libya from reaching international waters and bringing them back to shore can be 
considered an assistance to the commission by Libya of internationally wrongful acts or in the 
maintenance of the illegal situation in Libya. According to this, the EU training could be 
considered to be aiding Libya in a policy of refoulement, then being the EU engaged in the so-
called refoulement by proxy.
30
 As of 31 May 2018, 42% of migrants departing from Libya were 
pushed back, while in the same period in 2017, the proportion was 11%.
31
 Those who were 
brought back to Libya would most likely face ill-treatment once again. It appears that the issue is 
whether the EU training constitutes aid or assistance in the commission on internationally 
wrongful acts by the Libyan authorities. 
Under the rules of international responsibility, codified by the International Law 
Commission, “a State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible” if that State does so with knowledge of 
the circumstances, and the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State.
32
 
It seems unlikely that the training provided by EUNAVFOR MED to the LCG can be 
said to direct and control Libya to commit internationally wrongful acts. Since the purpose of the 
training of the Libyan officials is not aiming at the commission of any wrongful act, but based on 
human rights law, it can be concluded that no commission nor assistance is provided by the EU 
when the LCG commits internationally wrongful acts. Furthermore, the refoulement by proxy 
accusations lack an important fact: Non-Refoulement requires that a person is transferred, 
returned or extradited “to another State”.33 So, when Libyan authorities arrest migrants in their 
own territory or on the high seas and bring them back to Libya, no refoulement occurs. 
Actually, it can be stated that, provided the lack of authorization or consent to enter the 
Libyan territorial waters and inland, what the EU does by training the Libyan authorities could be 
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in furtherance of a duty to prevent abuses,
34
 in furtherance of Article 41 of the 2001 Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, that reads: “States shall cooperate to 
bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach”.35 
 
1.2 ACHIEVEMENTS  
 
EUNAVFOR MED activities since its establishment in 2015 have been subject to 
diverse criticism, not only for its failure to act (tackling smugglers and traffickers‟ businesses) 
but also on the achievement of its goals, which are regarded to be insufficient or even 
counterproductive. But, in order to determine whether an operation can be considered a success, 
it is necessary to identify the level of accomplishment of its goals. This means that an operation is 
successful when its purpose has been achieved and implemented in an appropriate manner from 
both the EU and a conflict perspective.
36
 
According to Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778, Operation Sophia‟s mandate is the 
disruption of the business model of smugglers and traffickers. Given the narrowness of the 
mandate and the imperative of rescuing people in distress at sea, saving lives turns to be an 
immediate objective of Operation Sophia as well.  
Given these two objectives, how can the degree of success be assessed? If the mission is 
successful, we can argue that networks‟ ability to bring migrants into international waters would 
be curtailed from the Libyan shores at least for a certain period of time.
37
 This doesn‟t mean that 
the migrants would disappear or that all of the smugglers and traffickers would be neutralised. 
So, a successful operation should have resulted in a reduction of flows and the arrest of criminals. 
Regarding this, a very important factor needs to be considered: as Operation Sophia advanced 
into territorial waters, smugglers and traffickers moved back to Libya, where no action could be 
taken. Consequently, the success of Operation Sophia in disrupting the smugglers and traffickers 
business must only be considered on the range of action that EUNAVFOR MED has had, which 
is really difficult to calculate.  
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1.2.1 Disrupting the Smugglers and Traffickers Business Model 
 
From October to December 2015, 46 suspected smugglers and traffickers were 
arrested.
38
 Dating to October 2016, just one year after engaging in active endeavour, Operation 
Sophia contributed to the arrest of 89 suspected smugglers and traffickers.
39
 As for April 2017, as 
mentioned, the number of criminals arrested was of 109, and by the end of June 2018, the total 
number was 148 suspected smugglers and traffickers arrested by Operation Sophia. What can be 
concluded by taking a look at the data is the confirmation of the before mentioned: criminals 
adapted their strategies and got out of the high seas as EUNAVFOR MED advanced toward 
them. In its first three months of activity, the naval assets contributed to the arrest of 
approximately the same amount of criminals as in the entire year 2016. 
Furthermore, in order to deliver an exact assessment on the achievements of Operation 
Sophia in the arrest of criminals, further data is required, especially regarding the number of 
smugglers and traffickers involved in individual activities, to be fully aware of the relevance (or 
lack of it) of the arrests accomplished by EUNAVFOR MED. Unfortunately, this data is almost 
impossible to gather, as long as no action can be taken in Libya, where the criminals plan and 
proceed with their activities. 
Finally, the conducted activities of data-gathering and networking together with other 
EU Agencies like Europol, Eurojust or Frontex are not published. Notice that Phase 1 of 
EUNAVFOR MED consisted on data gathering, which probably has been used by these Agencies 
to conduct arrests of smugglers and traffickers, thanks to the data collected by Operation Sophia. 
Data published on arrests conducted includes only those carried out directly by the naval assets 
under the direction of Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino. 
 
1.2.2 Preventing Loss of Life at Sea 
 
Analysing the outcome of the naval Operation regarding search and rescue activities, 
this means, saving migrants and asylum-seekers in distress at sea and thus preventing deaths, is 
quite easier. For that purpose, the comparison between the total flow of migrants in the Central 
Mediterranean route in a fixed period and the amount of deaths in the same route for the same 
period, can give a good overview of the outcomes of the several actors (military operations and 
NGOs mainly) in search and rescue activities. In addition, total amount of rescued people by the 
naval assets of Operation Sophia, together is to be considered. 
As the data from International Organization for Migration (IOM) shows, the death rate 
for the Central Mediterranean route has been always lower since Operation Sophia was launched, 
compared to the previous data: From January to October 2015 the death rate was of 6.3%, while 
from October to December 2015, the death rate lowered to 2.51%. The death rates over 2016 and 
2017 has been of 2.52% and 2.38% respectively.
40
 As data shows, the percentage of people who 
drowned or disappeared at sea in their attempts to reach European shores declined dramatically 
after the deployment of naval forces (deaths over the total flow of migrants in the Central 
Mediterranean route). 
Since the beginning of EUNAVFOR MED‟s activities, more than 44,000 lives have 
been saved at sea following search and rescue activities. The total people saved at sea of 
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Operation Sophia together with Frontex‟s Joint Operation Triton reaches 290,000 lives. 
Conclusions do differ,
41
 but from this analysis we can conclude that Operation Sophia has been a 
“humanitarian success”.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2.3 Operation Sophia v Operation Atalanta and Operation Mare Nostrum  
 
Assessment of the achievements of EUNAVFOR MED must be completed by 
comparing it‟s outcomes with other operations. Clarification on how successful Operation Sophia 
has been on tackling the smugglers and traffickers business can be helped through comparison 
with EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta. As for the search and rescue outcomes of Operation 
Sophia, comparison with people rescued by Italy‟s Operation Mare Nostrum is necessary. 
EU Operation Atalanta has considerably helped in tackling piracy off the coast of 
Somalia. Taking a look at the number of total attacks, in 2009 there were 163, combining aborted 
attacks, hostages and ships held by pirates.
43
 By October 2016, the number dropped to no 
hostages and ships being held by pirates, with more than 160 pirates being transferred to 
competent authorities for prosecution.
44
 Since the beginning of Atalanta, all of the World Food 
Program vessels operating in Somali waters have achieved its tasks suffering no attacks from 
pirates. Extension to the land territory of Somalia was based on the UNSC Resolution 
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1851/2008.
45
 What EUNAVFOR Atalanta has achieved on Somalia is considered, thus, as a 
whole success, given the complete reduction of piracy over the Somali coast, and the high level 
of accomplishment of the Operation‟s goal. Nevertheless, there is a difference between Atalanta 
and Sophia‟s ranges of action: while EUNAVFOR was granted permission to act on the coastal 
State‟s territory and territorial waters, EUNAVFOR MED hasn‟t yet. Furthermore, cooperation 
with Somali and Kenyan authorities granted detention and prosecution of suspected pirates in 
Somalia, while no agreement has been signed with Libya on that regard for Operation Sophia. It 
can be concluded that cooperation with the coastal State is the key point when comes to tackling 
illegal activities on its territory. We will have to wait for the eventual consent of Libya to deliver 
a complete analysis of Sophia‟s success rate.  
On the other hand, Italy‟s emergency Operation Mare Nostrum rescued 156,362 
migrants and asylum-seekers in 2014.
46
 This outnumbers by far the 44,000 people rescued by 
Operation Sophia in almost three years of activity. Even though Mare Nostrum‟s mandate was 
the engaging in search and rescue activities,
47
 and not Operation Sophia‟s. Yet, other factors must 
be considered: since 2015, more actors got involved in the Southern Central Mediterranean. 
Frontex‟s Joint Operation Triton began its activity in May 2015, and the very same month, 
various NGOs got involved as well,
48
 resulting in a shared distribution on search and rescue tasks 
that previously Mare Nostrum conducted by itself. According to an MSF‟s report, SAR 
operations during 2016 conducted 46,806 rescues on the high seas, 17% of them by Operation 
Sophia, and 8% by Frontex. Can be concluded that the presence of more actively involved actors 
on the Central Mediterranean resulted in the distribution of the SAR activities. 
In addition, it is to be recalled that Operation Sophia is an integrated part of the EU‟s 
comprehensive approach to migration. The EU‟s outcome on SAR activities involves 
participation of other Agencies like Frontex. From February 2016 to June 2018, the EU has 
rescued with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and EUNAVFOR MED Operation 
Sophia more than 290,000 lives,
49
 confirming the EU‟s involvement as a humanitarian actor. 
 
2. REALIZATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE SINCE THE 
LAUNCH OF OPERATION SOPHIA 
 
2.1 LESSONS LEARNED: ENHANCING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 
 
2.1.1 The Need to Enable Legal and Safe Ways to Reach Europe 
  
The only definitive way to tackle the business model of migrant smugglers and human 
traffickers is, as recognized by the European Council in June 2018 to prevent tragic loss of life at 
sea, to put an end to their need to embark on perilous journeys.
50
 Developing legal pathways to 
persons in need is a requirement of the comprehensive approach to migration, and it‟s the only 
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way to tackle irregular flows. There is a wide range of measures that Member States could adopt 
in order to increase the possibilities for refugees and asylum-seekers to travel in a safe and legal 
way to EU territory. The most important ones include the issuance of humanitarian visas, a more  
flexible use of family reunification procedures, or the increase of resettlement places along the 
EU.
51
 
Since the beginning of the migratory crisis in 2015, the EU‟s response has been varied, 
and always acting after alarming events taking place. The EU‟s temporary emergency scheme 
was decided in 2015 by the Council, in which Member States committed to relocate up to 
160,000 people from Italy and Greece hotspots.
52
 Later on, the EU-Turkey joint action plan was 
adopted, under which Turkey would try to stop migratory flows to the EU, and offer safe ways 
for refugees to access the Union.
53
 The EU-Turkey joint action plan proved to be far from 
achieving its goals, and the European Council, on March 2016, called for an acceleration of the 
implementation of relocation. On July 2016, the European Commission proposed a permanent 
EU Resettlement Framework to establish a common set of standard procedures for the selection 
of resettlement candidates that has not been adopted yet.
54
  
This legal and safe pathway to reach the European Union would require a major 
consensus of Member States and a strong commitment to the principles of responsibility and 
solidarity. According to the June 2018 European Council, a reform on the Dublin Regulation 
would be also required.
55
 Yet, in 2016, the European Commission drafted a proposal to reform 
the Common European Asylum System, the Dublin IV Regulation, providing a faster mechanism 
to deal with situations of disproportionate pressure on Member States‟ asylum systems. 
Nevertheless, the urgency of the current situation calls for further measures.  
On his State of the Union Address on 12 September 2018, president of the European 
Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, presented a new package of measures to better tackle 
migration, alleging that ad-hoc solutions cannot be the EU answer. According to Juncker, the 
European Commission will present three new proposals to ensure full EU solidarity on migration 
and protection of the EU‟s external borders: Enhancing legal and safe ways to reach Europe, the 
reinforcement of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), and the extension of 
the mandate of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). 
The European Commission called Member States to deliver on their commitment to 
resettle 50,000 persons by October 2019, and to agree on the Commission proposal for a Union 
Resettlement Framework on a fairer distribution on resettlement applications.
56
 So far 
approximately 40,000 people have been resettled since 2015. Establishing legal migratory routes 
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also requires, according to Juncker, the strengthening of cooperation with African countries of 
origin and transit. The European Commission confirmed pilot projects to be started at the end of 
2018, in order to cooperate in the establishment on legal migration, including labour and 
traineeship agreements, and well as readmission and returns. 
 In order to reinforce the operational capability of Frontex, the European Commission 
announced that new staff, tools and financial means would help the Agency on its tasks of 
supporting Member States through the Asylum Procedure, as well as during the procedure under 
the Dublin Regulation.
57
 To achieve this goal, Frontex will increase its agents by 10,000 by the 
year 2020, being able to rely on its own staff. Frontex will deploy, after request by the Member 
States, migration management support teams, who will help assisting in identification and 
registration of asylum-seekers, providing logistical support and translation services, and 
preparing administrative decisions on applications for international protection. The Agency will 
be authorized to launch joint operations in order to patrol borders and intercept vessels. The 
intention behind this reinforcement of Frontex by the European Commission relies on the help 
the Agency could supply to Member States to better manage migratory waves.  
The revised proposal for a European Union Agency for Asylum aims to establish a close 
link between the Agency and Frontex in the assistance to Member States where their asylum and 
reception systems are subject to pressure.
58
 As with Frontex, the European Commission aims to 
extend the mandate of the EASO into a full-fledged European Union Agency for Asylum, as well 
as its assets and operability. If the proposal is adopted, the Agency will be able to assist MS with 
identification and registration procedures, registration and examination of international protection 
applications, and to assist them with their obligations under the Dublin Regulation. The proposal 
states that the Agency will cooperate with Frontex, Europol and other EU Agencies, but doesn‟t 
specify how.
59
  
 
2.1.2 The Need to Establish a Mechanism to Prosecute Suspected Smugglers and 
Traffickers 
  
Another relevant aspect that Operation Sophia‟s activities pointed out, is the lack of a 
working mechanism to prosecute suspected migrant smugglers or human traffickers apprehended 
by its task force. It is obvious that, in order to carry out prosecution, the naval assets are not 
valid, and that police and judicial cooperation are required. So far, suspected criminals have only 
been prosecuted by Italy, because of the need of Italy to deal with the huge migratory flows on its 
territory, but neither Italy nor other EU Member State are compelled to carry out prosecution 
against mafias. Also, the way some procedures have been carried, such as interviewing migrants 
just upon arrival to ports, underlines the need to establish a coordinated mechanism at the EU 
level, as a part of the comprehensive approach. 
Operation Sophia has contributed to the arrest of 148 suspected smugglers and 
traffickers by the end of June 2018. Nevertheless, Sophia is not a police operation. Only in 2016, 
Joint Operation Triton contributed to the arrest of 588 smugglers and traffickers. Nevertheless, 
arrests carried out by the naval forces are taken advantage of in order to interview migrants and 
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gain information about their journeys.
60
 Italian prosecutors receive information from the naval 
officers immediately after the embarkation of a ship. The activities conducted on board are then 
filed in a report and handed over to the Italian prosecutor, who is present whenever a ship arrives.  
In addition, in the aftermath of concluded rescue operations, Frontex agents have 
interrogated migrants upon arrival,
61
 on what some call to be a process of “knowledge extraction” 
from migrants, turning them into informants about the mafias‟ activities, instead of integrating 
them as witnesses in a judicial procedure.  
This is the key reason of why the European Union should coordinate effort to establish a 
completely defined prosecution scheme, but not the only one: transition into Phase 2B would 
allow Operation Sophia to act against migrant smugglers and human traffickers on the Libyan 
inland and territorial waters, but not to transport them to the EU upon prosecution. A Libyan 
authorization would also be required for suspected criminals to be transferred for prosecution.
62
 
The European Union main political actors have to face this twofold issue (on how to prosecute 
criminals on the EU and to reach transfer agreements with Libya) for the total disruption of the 
smugglers and traffickers business models.  
It is obvious that the political situation in Libya is a key factor for the EU‟s goals, even 
regarding judicial cooperation. For now, the absence of smugglers in international waters caused 
Italian prosecutors to describe their current judicial procedures as a stalemate,
63
 and the same 
goes for the European Union itself. 
It some authors‟ view that the consecution of prosecution and judiciary cooperation 
agreements along the EU would be enhanced by the establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor‟s Office (EPPO).64 In June 2017, 20 EU Member States reached an agreement on the 
establishment of the EPPO under enhanced cooperation, which right now counts on 21 Member 
States. But the EPPO‟s tasks include only the prosecution of criminal offences affecting the 
financial interests of the Union.
65
 Nevertheless, the TFEU also states that the EPPO‟s scope can 
be extended “to include serious crime having cross-border dimension”.66 It seems that the future 
of the EU‟s fight against migrant smugglers and human traffickers could be on the extended 
mandate of the EPPO, but now this seems far to be reached. 
 
2.2 CONSEQUENCES AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
 
2.2.1 The Principle of Solidarity, at Hand  
  
The migratory crisis starting in 2015 and the arrival of migrants and asylum-seekers over 
to Europe have pulled the strings of the European politics, both at national and international 
levels. Migration has been the best opportunity for far-right movements along the European 
Union to gain political relevance. Political groups have taken advantage of the situation in order 
to produce a grey migratory definition, combining both legal and illegal migration, together with 
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applicants for international protection, for gaining support among voters. A new right-winged 
movement lead by Austrian chancellor Sebastian Kurz called for the formation of an “anti-
migration axis”, together with Italy and Germany (where the German interior minister Horst 
Seehofer confronts Angela Merkel‟s open doors policy).67 The proposal comes after Italy closed 
it‟s ports to a rescue ship carrying over 600 refugees. 
In fact, Italy has been the first EU Member State sparking the current crisis by closing 
the country‟s ports to foreign-flagged migrant rescue ships, after populist-right party Five Star-
League coalition coming to government in the elections of March 2018. After that, Italy refused 
to tack back any migrants stopped at the German border, and threatened to close ports and 
withdraw from Operation Sophia if the European Union doesn‟t establish a distribution system 
for arriving migrants and asylum-seekers.
68
 Austria and Germany‟s interior minister joined the 
Italian government backing these ideals. In a joint statement by Seehofer and Kurz, both 
explained that their goal is to tackle irregular migration in order to avoid situations like the one 
taking place after 2015.
69
 
In the meanwhile, tension and debate over the involved countries increases together with 
the debate on migration situation that fosters the support to the far-right anti-immigration 
movements. In Germany, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is currently hitting a 
record high, as support for Chancellor Angela‟s Merkel bloc decreases.70 
On the other side of the coin, countries like Germany, France and Spain support the EU-
wide approach to migration, with Spain accepting the rejected 600 migrants boat that tried to 
arrive to Italy. Tensions between the two blocks reached its top when France President 
Emmanuel Macron accused Rome of cynicism and irresponsibility after refusing to take the 
ship.
71
 
The Italy, Austria and Germany “axis” has called for the reinforcement of the EU‟s 
external borders, by militarization, with the HR replying that military operations under the CSDP 
frame can only take place outside the EU‟s territory.72 The obvious divide between the two 
blocks could endanger EUNAVFOR MED‟s future, as Italy threatens to withdraw from the fight 
against smugglers and traffickers if the European Union doesn‟t revise the Operation‟s mandate 
regarding disembarkation of migrants and asylum-seekers. Rome asserted it will no longer allow 
for disembarkation on its ports.
73
 Implications and consequences are to be asserted in future 
Political and Security Commission meetings. 
Hungary has been the last country to join the political centre in migration matters. The 
country that erected a barbed wire fence along its borders with Croatia and Serbia to prevent 
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migrants from crossing the Balkan route to Europe, and rejected to participate in the EU policy 
on resettlement,
74
 is now facing possible sanctions by the EU after the European Parliament 
successfully voted on a proposal to the Council of the EU to act against Hungary under Article 7 
TEU for breach of the EU‟s founding values. In particular, Parliament‟s key concerns include the 
independence of Hungarian judicial system, corruption, freedom of religion or the fundamental 
rights of migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees.
75
 This is the first time this procedure is 
activated, and the Council will now determine whether there is a serious breach of the EU values 
in Hungary, eventually leading to sanctions, such as the suspension of the voting rights in the 
Council for Hungary.  
Finally, some argue that Viktor Orban, the Hungarian leader, could be orchestrating the 
formation of a new alliance of the far-right movements along Europe in the European 
Parliament.
76
 It could bring together populist right-wing parties from Hungary, Germany, Poland, 
Italy, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, and France, and split from the European People‟s Party (EPP 
Group), where some of them are integrated. 
Being this the political situation, the EU heads of state or government are gathering in 
Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018 in an informal meeting under the Austrian Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union, where internal security and migration are to be discussed. 
 
2.2.2 Heading towards a Better CSDP Integration? 
  
Could maritime security in the Mediterranean be a future integration pillar for the 
Common Security and Defense Policy? After the sinking tragedy in 2015, the European Union 
declared war on smugglers and traffickers operating in the Mediterranean Sea. But the existing 
threats are not only related to migration: the Mediterranean Sea has become a route of trafficking 
drugs, arms, and money.
77
 The interests of the EU as well as peace and security are directly 
affected by the situation in the Mediterranean.  
As geopolitics swift to the sea, understanding how, why, and in what way the European 
Union establishes itself as a maritime actor is relevant for the broader international relations 
community. The involvement of the EU with Operation Sophia challenges the commonly held 
assumption that the EU will act as a “soft power” at sea.78 Nevertheless, since the launch of 
Operation Atalanta, and the adoption of the Integrated Maritime Policy, maritime security has 
been one of the fastest growing areas of EU security integration.  
Atalanta and Sophia have been highly successful regarding defence integration. 
Participating Member States and the support provided by them to the naval operations proves so. 
In fact, the launching of naval operations for crisis management could be seen as a step forward 
for the creation of a Security and Defence Union.
79
 Furthermore, after Brexit, defence integration 
can be enhanced, after the UK leaving, which has always been reluctant to support any EU 
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operations, and always backed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) led operations. In 
fact, during the Bratislava Summit on 16 September 2016, the first after Brexit, a priority was set 
aiming to reinforce cooperation in the European Union regarding external security and defence 
matters.
80
 
Moreover, the European Parliament passed on 22 November 2016 a resolution 
proposing that all Member States should increase military expenditure and that the European 
Union should take an active role regarding security matters alongside with NATO.
81
 
Furthermore, on 11 December 2017, the Council of the EU adopted Council Decision (CFSP) 
2017/2315, establishing the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and determining a list 
of participating Member States.
82
 
Those measures came in just a moment when the security and migration were top 
concern among Europeans.
83
 At the same time, future president of the United States of America, 
candidate Donald J. Trump, stated that he was going to let Europe take its security in its own 
hands.
84
 Also, the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation raised a major concern over 
the European citizens. To face all of this challenges, the European Union must react as a whole. 
According to the report published by the EU Institute for Security Studies in 2016, “no single 
European country is able to manage the violent conflicts, hybrid warfare challenges and 
sophisticated cyber-attacks now taking place around Europe on its own”.85 
Probably, the time for PESCO has come, and Operation Sophia could have acted as a 
trial when it came to Defence Integration in the European Union. The EU must be aware that 
security threats in the sea do not only concern coastal states, but all the Member States.  
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